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Abstract 
Highly dynamic computing environments, like ubiquitous and 
pervasive computing environments, require frequent adaptation 
of applications. Context is a key to adapt suiting user needs. On 
the other hand, standard access control trusts users once they 
have authenticated, despite the fact that they may reach 
unauthorized contexts. We analyse how taking into account 
dynamic information like context in the authorization subsystem 
can improve security, and how this new access control applies to 
interaction patterns, like messaging or eventing. We experiment 
and validate our approach using context as an authorization 
factor for eventing in Web service for device (like UPnP or 
DPWS), in smart home security.1 
Key words: Access Control, Context-awareness, Dynamic 
Authorization, Context-sensitive Authorization, Interaction 
Patterns 
1. Introduction 
Ubiquitous computing, under the leadership of Mark 
Weiser’s vision [1], has made computing evolve toward 
multi-device, multi-user, and highly dynamic environ-
ments. Miniaturization of hardware and new wireless 
communication networks have created new devices, worn 
by users or surrounding them. Due to mobility, devices 
appear and disappear frequently in such environments. 
The major concern in ubiquitous or pervasive computing is 
adapting applications to users surroundings, and more 
generally, to their context. In these works, we focus on 
limiting communications between entities that are in the 
same context, or in a context authorized by a security 
system, for security purposes. Indeed, information invol-
ved in ubiquitous computing communications is often 
privacy-sensitive, and we need to make sure it cannot be 
received or intercepted by unauthorized entities. 
                                                           
1 This work is currently supported by ANR project ANR-08-VERS-005 
* Currently delegated as INRIA researcher in the team PULSAR 
Access control [2] relies on and coexists with 
authentication, authorization and audit. Authentication can 
be made on information or persons: it establishes who 
issued a piece of information, or confirms the identity of a 
person. However, to ensure that the identity is correct, 
different authentication factors shoud be used. If the 
person possesses the information related to each factor, it 
is assumed that this is the pretended person [3]. 
Authorization takes places both before system execution, 
to define policies of the security system, and after the 
authentication phase, to grant a principal access to the 
controlled system. We will study in the following section 
that authorization is most often static or controlled by 
applications, leading the users to be considered authorized 
for a long time. With context changes we cannot assume 
that a user is authorized throughout the duration of the use 
of an application, even if he is still authentified. We will 
then explore works on dynamic authorization. 
2. Authorization  
We could identify three types of authorization in existing 
systems: static, quasi-static, and dynamic authorization. 
Numerous works have already explored these subjects, 
aiming to handle more dynamicity in access control 
systems. In parallel, we explain how context appeared in 
authorization, and what properties are mandatory for 
dynamic environments. 
2.1 Static Authorization 
Historically, access control used static credentials to 
confirm user identity and was made only when entering the 
system. For example, the login phase of an operating 
system needs a login and a password to authenticate a user, 
and is made only when he logs in. It can also be an ID 
card, a fingerprint pattern, or an identification token. 
Infrastructure information is sometimes used to authenti-
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cate users. For example, the Network File System (NFS) 
access control uses, in its default configuration, the IP 
address of a client to grant him access, as long as he still 
uses the file system. 
Classical authorization rule, also called access policy or 
condition, expressed that a subject, also called principal 
[2, 4], can access to an operation on a particular object. 
This can take various forms, for instance the subject can be 
a group of users as in the well-known role-based access 
control systems (RBAC), the object can be a computer, a 
service or an object instance. 
We model the access control process with finite state 
diagrams. In Figure 1, a subject wants to use a system, and 
he has to authenticate himself in the first place. Since this 
is static authorization, if authentication is correct and 
matches an authorization rule, he stays authorized and 
considered trusted until he logs off. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Static authorization. 
2.2 Quasi-static Authorization 
More than ten years ago, static information for 
authentication and authorization began to be seen as a 
limitation in several domains. In distributed computing for 
example, with Nitsche et al. [5] and Cholewka et al. [6], 
the task being done could affect access control on some 
objects. The task was extracted from the workflow of the 
application, and this dynamic information was considered 
as contextual information for the application.  
When context becomes a part of the authorization process, 
it is not only subject’s identity that leads to a granted 
authorization anymore. Access control evolves from 
identity-based towards attribute-based and context-based 
authorization [7]. Since this kind of information is dynamic 
by nature, and especially in mobile or ubiquitous 
environments, the authorization must not be granted 
forever. Besides, in these systems, operations on which 
access control applies are generally finer-grained, which 
also requires to enforce authorization rules more often.  
Moreover, separation of authentication and authorization 
process for dynamic information introduction in the access 
control process is put forward. In [6], users do not receive 
an authorization if context is not valid, even if they are 
authenticated. In RBAC systems, the same pattern appears 
[8]: a user is granted membership of a role but is not able 
to perform operations until infor-mation required for 
dynamic authorization is validated. 
Later popularized by Web applications, session manage-
ment has emphasized what we call quasi-static authori-
zation. In these systems, credentials and other access 
control conditions are rarely changed compared to the 
lifespan of applications. Authorization is made at first 
access of the system, and periodically renewed to keep 
users authorized in case of information change in authen-
tication or authorization information. This mechanism is 
called leasing, and also often used in publish/subscribe 
systems [9]. We modelled it in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Quasi-static authorization. 
The main difference with static authorization is that a 
transition appears from authorized to unauthorized states. 
Whenever the lease expires, the subject has to be 
authorized again to return in trusted state. It is the 
application that defines for how long the subject is 
considered trusted. 
Quasi-static authorization prevents users to be connected 
to a system forever. Changes in credentials, in the 
environment or the introduction of a new authentication 
factor in the access control system eventually lead to user’s 
credential reevaluation and authorization policy 
reenforcement. As an example of such system in industry, 
we can cite Mobilegov Access Control [10] that uses 
infrastructure-based authentication in addition to pass-
word based authentication for different kind of systems. 
2.3 Dynamic Authorization 
Static and quasi-static authorization systems are inade-
quate for highly dynamic environments in which user’s 
context is an important concern, and is already a part of 
applications. As we already seen with quasi-static 
authorization, not using contextual information in security 
concerns could lead to granting a user access without 
considering his condition [11]. Besides, handling context 
in access control systems has been identified as a key 
concern of pervasive computing evolution [12]. More 
precisely, it is the authorization that should be related to 
context-sensitivity [13]. 
Contextual information is highly dynamic, because the user 
is likely to be moving, as much as other users in the same 
ambient space, with their attached devices. Yet, sensors 
can be fixed in the physical infrastructure, like temperature 
or light sensors. Contextual dynamic information is used to 
invalidate subject’s authorization, even if he is still 
identified by standard authentication factors. 
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Thus, we introduce the dynamic authorization model for 
environments in which it is needed to frequently check if 
subjects are authorized due to changes in dynamic 
information used for authorization. This open gates to 
considering highly dynamic contextual information to be 
used in the access control process. As opposition to static 
and quasi-static authorization, dynamic authorization 
requires to be rechecked according to changes in dynamic 
information. It is necessary to dynamically modify access 
permissions granted to subjects when context information 
or when software infrastructure change. 
While in static and quasi-static authorization subjects were 
trusted as long as they were logged or for a predefined 
time, in dynamic authorization, authorization must be 
checked at each operation in the system. This can be done 
in two ways: 
• The first would be to reduce the lease time near zero, 
and thus needing subjects to authenticate and 
subscribe all the time. Lease time has to be adapted to 
system’s reactivity, which is around one second for 
ubiquitous computing applications for example. This is 
very inefficient and consequently a bad solution for 
embedded devices populating ubiquitous computing 
environments, 
• The second, to be more efficient, would need the 
system be notified about subject’s context all along his 
use of the system. In that case, the system could react 
on context changes by enforcing authorization policies 
to determine if the subject is still authorized and can 
be kept or not the trusted area. We modelled this 
system in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3 Event-driven dynamic authorization. 
With this second solution, trusted zone exit and re-entery 
are context-driven. Since the dynamics of the context and 
of the application are different, the access control process 
is highly reactive. Quasi-static and static authorization 
process, in contrast, were driven by the application. It also 
means that a new concern appears as a part of the access 
control process: dynamic information management. 
New issues appear with management of contexual 
information for authorization purpose. For example, the 
Context-aware provisional-based access control 
(CAPBAC) [7], formalizes how contextual information 
should be managed in an access control system. In a such 
system, actions can be performed between the authenti-
cation validation and granting the access to the subject. 
Information has to be present in the system when context-
based authorization rules are evaluated. 
Cuppens et al. [15] also formalized a context-sensitive 
authorization process using logic rules. They defined how 
contextual constraints of five types could be added to the 
system: temporal, spatial, prerequisite depending on 
subject’s action’s history, user-declared goals and provi-
sions. However, the way all information is gathered is 
predefined and they don’t address how the system can 
adapt to changes in the infrastructure, like appearance of 
new information sources. McDaniel, in other formaliza-
tion works, states that policy conditions are external 
complex general purposes programs [13] and thus can 
adapt to infrastructure changes. 
More than purely contextual issues, like the type of 
contextual information and the way it is collected, security 
issues are also linked with these new challenges: 
• How to ensure that dynamic information is authentic? 
As stated Kindberg and Zhang, in their experience in 
the location-aware mobile computing CoolTown 
project [3]: when using contextual information for 
access control, the authentication of the data itself 
must be done. Indeed, dynamic data are provided by 
sensors, and they can be simulated of falsified if 
protocols are not constrained as in [3]. In some cases 
with group behaviors, information can also be corre-
lated with surrounding entities’ to check forged infor-
mation [4]. If sensors are not able to sign information, 
it has to be authenticated when users collect it. A 
trusted observer has to collect the same information 
than users in order to authenticate it, and verify that it 
is this information that is used by users to access the 
system. 
• What about privacy? Of course, placing a trusted 
entity in users computing environment can be recusant. 
Westin [16] defined privacy as “the ability to 
determine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about us is communicated to others”. If 
the trusted entity describes precisely how contextual 
information is used, it should be accepted by users. 
Furthermore, one must consider that
Table 1: Classification of context-aware access control projects 
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machine-to-machine communications play a more and 
more important role, and that privacy in those cases is 
not relevant. 
• Granted access implies information leak? Hengartner 
and Steenkiste [17] state that being granted access to a 
system using context-sensitive authorization can leak 
some private information. Since access is limited to a 
predefined context, observing that a user obtained 
access is equivalent to know that he is in that context. 
Their solution is to introduce secret fields in 
contextual conditions. [18] use confidentiality in 
authorization rules. Our idea is to define several 
applicable conditions, possibly subject-dependant. 
 
A good example of dynamic authorization based system is 
the work of Bacon et al., who introduce in [14] the OASIS 
(Open Architecture for Securely Interworking Services) 
Role-Based Access Control. It uses credentials that a user 
possesses, along with side conditions that depend on the 
state of the environment, to authorize him to activate a 
number of roles. In their model, predicates can be used for 
environmental constraints or context-sensitive information. 
Environmental constraints can be checked by any entity in 
the environment of the application, thus it can authenticate 
dynamic information used for authorization. 
2.4 Synthesis 
The Table 1 summarizes the types of authorization and 
contextual information featured by the projects taking into 
accound context in an access control process. The AuthZ 
column refers to the dynamicity of the authorization as we 
studied it; the Information from column summarizes how 
contextual information is obtained and if it is authenticated 
in the AuthN column (“1” if it is). The granularity of the 
access control, or the domain of application is found in the 
Targetted system column. Finally, the Oper column 
describes what operators can be used to define rules based 
on contextual information: “=” denotes the equality only, 
“CL” means comparizon and logic operators and thus more 
complex rules, “= AND” for equality of information and 
composition with logic AND rules, “range” means that 
ranges of values are allowable, “= zone” is equality on 
coordinates, so we guess there is a range mechanism. 
Most projects marqued as quasi-static are not conceived 
for highly dynamic environments. Contextual information 
is not triggering changes in authorization granted or 
rejected to users. Applications have to poll for changes 
when they decide it is needed. We can also notice that only 
a few projects are concerned about contextual infor-mation 
authentication. As rightly stated by McDaniel [13], 
condition security has been largely forgotten by recent 
works in authorization policies. And beyond that, either the 
source of information is restricted to some predefined 
types and entities, either there is a confiden-tiality leak in 
the system. 
We see from the table that no project is able to handle all 
required concerns for a general purpose dynamic authori-
zation system. It is a complicated task to manage contex-
tual information sources, gather contextual information, 
verify information authenticity, define dynamic authori-
zation rules, adapt security system to available sources, 
and actually authorize subjects to access the system in the 
same software architecture or framework. 
We will study our proposition tackling these challenges in 
following sections, but before that, in the next section, we 
will focus on the nature of operations for which authori-
zation rules are enforced. In highly dynamic environ-
ments, messages are often the most basic operation that has 
to be controlled. 
3. Access Control in Interaction Patterns 
The granularity of operations access control systems aim to 
limit to subjects can vary a lot. Some systems control 
access to a physical place, some other to networks, or to a 
machine. Dynamic authorization aims finer granularity 
operations, like messages. Messages in highly dynamic 
environments are often private, and an application of 
dynamic authorization is to manage confidentiality over a 
messaging channel. 
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In a more general way, dynamic authorization can be 
applied to all applications in which context can be used to 
limit something. For example, one could say: if you are not 
in my context, you won’t receive my information; if you 
are not in my context, you won’t even know who I am, and 
what I can provide to you. Everything in distri-buted 
computing is about interactions between entities, and using 
access control on messages allows us to create all 
applications based on context-aware access control. More 
than security, context-sensitive messaging has implications 
on power consumption of mobile devices that populate 
highly dynamic environments. 
  
Fig. 4 Sequence diagram of trusted zones in a publish/subscribe pattern. 
To emphasize where the problem is, we explain it for the 
well known publish/subscribe pattern [9] (Figure 4). 
Publish/subscribe systems are based on two kinds of inter-
actions: the subscription and notifications. Notifications 
allow the event producer to send information to subscribed 
entities that he does not necessarily know beforehand. 
The subscription is a synchronous process, like a request-
response pattern. It is used by consumers to register their 
interest to a specific event channel and to give informa-tion 
about the connection that will be used to send events. 
Notification is a purely asynchronous process, made of 
messages sent by the producer to the consumer. This 
process thus needs the consumer to be authorized to 
receive events. Since access control requires the consumer 
to send authentication and authorization information to the 
producer, it is practically done when the client subscribes. 
However, since following interactions are only one way 
messages, authorization of the subscriber cannot be 
verified. For static authorization, as we have seen, this is 
not a problem because after subscription, it is not supposed 
to have changed or it is not important for system’s security. 
With quasi-static authorization, the subscription is 
accepted only for a defined validity time: the lease. 
Subscriber is trusted only for this time, and has to renew 
his subscription and access, before the end of the lease, to 
avoid a service interruption. We call this lease of trust the 
trusted zone (Figure 4). A modelization of this process is 
equivalent to the quasi-static authorization diagram in 
Figure 2, in which the accessgranted transition is 
replaced by subscription and access control. 
What can be done for dynamic authorization of the 
recipient? Figure 4 helps to understand where the problem 
exactly is. The context observer notifies when context 
validity has changed. The observer lifeline is displayed 
only for comparizon purposes with the standard 
publish/subscribe leasing mechanism. Context changes 
happen while the consumer is in the trusted zone. With 
dynamic authorization, the producer would reenforce the 
authorization conditions as soon as an event from the 
context is received. With quasi-static authorization, the 
consumer is still able to receive notifications, even 
while his context is not authorized. 
We define the context trusted zone as the period during 
which the producer can be certain that the consumer is 
authorized by its context. Contrary to the trusted zone of 
usual interaction patterns in which information leak can 
occur, the context trusted zone ensures confidentiality of 
messages. 
Bacon et al. [19] already explored access control based on 
contextual information in publish/subscribe systems; with 
more details, they focus on a Message Oriented 
Middleware (MOM) for large scale architectures with 
multiple administration domains. They use a dedicated 
security infrastructure for credential management (OASIS 
RBAC [14]). They apply access control only on event 
brokers since they are the link to inter-domain networks. 
Their solution is thus based on managing security through 
a layer below the application layer: the transport layer. 
In the next section, we describe our contribution, how we 
handle dynamic access control for asynchronous 
communications recipients, in the application layer, and 
without needing a specific infrastructure for security or 
message management purposes. 
4. Context-based Dynamic Authorization 
We have seen in section 2 that in highly dynamic 
environments, static or quasi-static authorization should 
not be used for two reasons: some contexts are incom-
patible with the authorization granted in first place, and 
context evolves with a different dynamic than the 
application. We also have seen that an efficient solution 
would require a trusted entity from the security system to 
be placed in users’ context to ensure the authentication of 
dynamic information used for access control. 
We don’t want to focus only on a specific problem of the 
access control process, as most works we have studied did. 
Indeed, a context-sensitive access control architecture 
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should deal with all issues related to access, collection, 
storage, processing and distribution of context infor-
mation [4]. 
Therefore, we begin by presenting our context model, and 
how we manage contextual information (4.1). Then we 
present our dynamic authorization model with context-
sensitive rules (4.2) and we explain how it applies to all 
kinds of interaction patterns (4.3). 
4.1 Context Model 
As a basic context-aware system, contextual information 
collection is done using context observers [20]. We don’t 
want to delegate context management to a context toolkit 
or a context server, because that would prevent us from 
authenticating contextual information. Using such external 
information inside a security system like access control 
requires the establishment of a chain of trust all along the 
processing of information. 
Context observers are entities of the infrastructure that 
provide contextual information. We assume that, as most 
entities in higly dynamic environments, they can notify 
new information by sending events. They may not be 
sensors, but rather standard devices. We do not limit the 
type of information or the list of context observers. It can 
be any kind of environmental information, like tempera-
ture, localization, time, infrastructure information like what 
devices are present on the network, or any other 
information that can be authenticated, like history of user 
actions. 
Observers are dynamic entities. They appear and disap-
pear from the software infrastructure like any other device 
or application. Consequently, more than taking into 
account dynamic contextual information, we need to adapt 
to the high dynamicity of relevant observers presence. 
Indeed, before designing complex context management 
and context-aware applications for dynamic environ-ments, 
we need to be able to find observers that will provide 
contextual information. Thus, observers are dyna-mically 
discovered. Furthermore, context is built from distributed 
and decentralized information. 
An implication of such infrastructure dynamicity is that we 
will be able to define what authorization conditions should 
be enforced, depending on what observers are present. We 
define contextual conditions for authorization as a tuple of 
<context, operation, object>. The defined 
context has to be valid in order to authorize access to the 
operation of the object. 
Every device that will be used as an observer provides raw 
information. This information has to be processed in order 
to know if it corresponds to a valid context. We define φ 
functions as partial conditions, that validate a simple 
contextual information by returning a boolean value of 
validity. They are similar to McDaniel’s conditions, which 
are trusted external programs at the charge of the 
programmer [13]. Thus, each observer Obi is attached to a 
φi function. The set Φ of available φi for authorization 
rules dynamically depends on the presence of Obi in the 
infrastructure. 
Finally, authentication of contextual information is made 
by placing a trusted party in the context of the entity to 
verify that the information that is sent to the φ functions 
and the authorization condition enforcement is authentic. 
Placing it in its context provides access to the same 
information than it obtains. A big advantage of this 
authentication technique is that any device can become a 
contextual observer, and not just predefined or constrained 
ones. 
  
Fig. 5 Asynchronous communication and contexts. 
4.2 Dynamic Authorization Model 
Since the basic operation in our approach is the 
message, we represent in Figure 5 a simple application 
example of message sending between entities B and A. 
Rounds tagged with Obi represent context observers in A’s 
context. The problem is described as follows: when B 
sends a one-way message to A, how can it ensure that A is 
in a context in agreement with B’s policy for recipients? 
When observers are present, authenticated, and that the 
value of the contextual information they provide 
corresponds to an authorized value, the access is granted. 
The enforcement of an authorization condition is kept 
simple, based on a pre-requisite Π  and the actual 
enforcement operation Γ, here expressed as logic rules:  
 
Π ≡ valid(Ob1 ) ∧ ... ∧ valid(Obn) 
 
Γ ≡ φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn 
 
These rules imply that when an observer is missing, or is 
not able of being authenticated, the enforcement Γ won’t 
be done. Conditions based on φ are removed from the list 
of active conditions when Obi is missing. When all 
observers can be properly used in the security process, the 
authorization is only granted when all φ functions which 
are a part of this condition return valid context infor-
mation. Since they provide a boolean information, a simple 
AND logic operator is used for evaluation. 
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Conditions are written as part of the authorization process 
to grant access to subjects. Several rules should exist for 
one subject, each based on different observers. This allow 
to grant subjects access based on contextual information 
while they evolve in not already discovered environments. 
It also means that when several conditions are applicable 
(when their Π is true), they should not specialize the 
contextual conditions, but offer alternatives, in order to 
avoid authorization revocation if an observer of one 
condition becomes out of valid context. Consequently, 
between each condition, a OR logic operator is used for 
evaluation. 
To summarize how conditions are written, if several 
observers need to be used to define one context, their 
information, through the use of their φ function, must be 
used in a single condition. On the contrary, if several 
observers define several contexts, and that mere subsets of 
these observers can define a valid context for authoriza-
tion, then several conditions should be written. Figure 6 
represents on one side observers and their associated φ 
function of evaluation, and on the other side contextual 
authorization conditions based on φ functions. 
  
Fig. 6 Authorization conditions and based on observers availability. 
Once a subject is authenticated, the status of its 
authorization is bound to the status of validity of 
information provided by observers that are in activated 
conditions in the system. Thanks to event commu-nications 
between observers, φ functions and conditions, 
authorization are granted and revoked dynamically and 
reactively, which is the very essence of dynamic 
authorization. 
Our contribution is to dynamically add trusted context 
observers in the context of entities, that notify the 
controlling entity from changes in contextual information 
that are used for end-to-end access control. 
4.3 Application to All Interaction Patterns 
We already took the example of publish/subscribe systems 
to describe how the problem could appear. However, other 
interaction patterns may have the same information leak 
issue on context changes. 
 
Synchronous interactions: The most representative 
synchronous interaction pattern is the request/response 
mode, used in method invocation and Remote Method 
Invocation (RMI). In this pattern, two messages are used 
for each interaction. The first is sent by the consumer to 
request the execution of some procedure on the producer, 
possibly with parameters. The second message is sent by 
the producer to the consumer with the result of the 
processing. 
We depicted in Figure 7 a dynamic authorization example 
for request/response patterns. As a synchronous pattern, it 
is usually supposed more secure than asynchronous 
patterns. Subjects are often considered trusted during a 
method invocation, for example in [5]. But as we see in the 
figure, the same problem appears in this pattern too. 
The first message is used by the consumer to send his 
contextual or authentication information in order to grant 
access to the method invocation. A context change can 
occur after this message has been sent, placing the 
consumer in an unauthorized context. Moreover, the 
execution time of the method may take several seconds, or 
even minutes. In mobile environments, the infrastructure 
changes often, and these circumstances can happen quite 
frequently. 
With dynamic authorization, as soon as the context of the 
consumer gets unauthorized, the procedure processing can 
be stopped to spare resources, and the consumer is sent an 
access denied message. In contrast, with quasi-static 
authorization, the producer would not notice that the 
context has changed, and he would consider the consumer 
to be still in a trusted zone. The message potentially 
containing confidential information would be leaked. 
  
Fig. 7 Sequence diagram  with context trusted zones for request/response 
pattern. 
Signaling and broadcasting interactions: The third main 
class of interaction pattern we could identify is the 
signaling or broadcasting. This pattern is probably the 
most complicated in which access control can be handled. 
In DPWS (Device Profile for Web Services) for example, 
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WSDiscovery, which uses multicast messages for reactive 
discovery of Web services, is the only interaction scheme 
of DPWS that does not handle confidentiality [21]. The 
reason lies in the decoupling that it provides. Indeed, 
Eugster [9] has identified three types of coupling: 
• time: the consumer and the producer have to be online 
at the same time. The message is not bufferized, 
except at operating system level if this is a distributed 
interaction, and is thus processed immediately. 
• space: the consumer is known by the producer. In 
broadcasting and eventing patterns, producers and 
consumers are often called loosely coupled because 
they are not bound at design-time, nor designed 
specifically to execute one with each other. The space 
decoupling often leads to the fact that several 
consumers receive the producer’s messages. Likewise, 
in complex publish/subscribe systems, there can be 
several producers sending messages in the same 
application. 
• synchronization: the consumer is blocked until the 
producer sends the resulting message. This is typically 
how request/response is coupled. Asynchronous 
request/response actually decouples the 
synchronization of entities: the consumer is able to 
continue to execute and will be notified when the 
request’s response is ready. 
 
Signaling and broadcasting are decoupled in space and 
synchronization. Most eventing systems also have at least 
these two decoupling. The problem actually appears on a 
lower level: the transport layer. Publish/subscribe systems 
are space decoupled from the producer’s point of view, but 
not from the messaging system’s point of view. Indeed, 
consumers have to subscribe, and consequently they are 
known from the subscription system. Notifications are then 
sent using unicast messages to consumers. 
With broadcasting, consumers cannot be known. The 
pattern is purely one-way, like in TV broadcasting. They 
are considered in a trusted zone permanently. This is 
exactly the same problem that appears at the application 
layer of a publish/subscribe system. The producer may not 
be aware of subscriptions, and thus cannot deal with access 
control for each client. If we want to handle access control 
at the application layer, space decoupling has to use 
cryptography as a means of access control. 
In Bacon works [19], group cryptography is used to ensure 
confidentiality of events between trusted brokers. Keys are 
updated when principals are declared unauth-orized, and 
not when they unsubscribe, which makes updates happen 
less frequently in this kind of environ-ment. We will use 
the same technique to ensure that unauthorized entities 
cannot receive messages. 
The dynamic authorization can be applied on any message 
as long as there is at least one synchronous exchange for 
trust establishment. For signaling, a solution still exists 
when the consumer is able to reach the producer: the 
twostep signaling. A first message is broadcasted, 
containing no confidential information and only a basic 
description of how to reach the producer. The second step 
is initiated by consumers registering their interest for the 
information, like a subscription in publish/subscribe 
systems. Then, for notifications (broadcasts or signals), a 
group key encryption is used. Only consumers in 
authorized context will have access to the decryption key. 
As soon as the context of a consumer becomes 
unauthorized, the group key is changed and spread to other 
authorized consumers. 
The dynamic authorization in eventing and in 
broadcasting patterns can be handled the same way 
because of the space decoupling they both offer. This 
decoupling allows us to consider these two patterns as a 
single problem for context-awareness and access control. 
The application of this contribution to a specific 
infrastructure will allow us to verify it. 
5. Application for Eventing in Web Service 
for Device  
We chose to implement our context-sensitive authori-
zation with two specific architectures and paradigms: Web 
service for device for the software infrastructure, and 
publish/subscribe systems for asynchronous communica-
tion. Reasons of these choices revolve around two con-
cepts: ubiquitous computing and space decoupling. 
For many years, service oriented architectures (SOA) have 
been used in home automation, mobile, pervasive and 
ubiquitous computing to represent as services the sets of 
functionalities offered by devices. They offer lots of 
features discussed in [22] such as encapsulation, dynami-
city, discoverability and interoperability. They evolved 
from standard SOA to SO A for device (SOAD) by adding 
two main features: decentralized reactive discovery and 
asynchronous communications. 
Decentralized reactive discovery has been popularized by 
projects such as SLP (the Service Location Protocol) [23] 
or Jini [24]. They suppress the need of a service registry 
tracking all services active in a network domain. They use 
multicasted or broadcasted messages to notify that services 
appear or disappear. Asynchronous communica-tions used 
by SOAD like Jini are events in a publish/ subscribe 
scheme. 
These evolutions allow to create reactive dynamic 
distributed applications, suitable for ubiquitous computing 
environments. In addition, when Web technologies are 
used to implement SOAD, interoperability between all 
entities is enabled, whether they are heterogeneous devices 
or simple software services. Only two implemen-tations of 
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Web services for devices currently exist: UPnP 2  and 
DPWS [21]. UPnP has been created by the UPnP Forum, 
under the leadership of Microsoft in 1999. It has never be 
standardized, but is used in many objects of everyday life, 
like home gateways, or media centers. DPWS appeared in 
2004, as a replacement for UPnP, and as a technology 
based on several Web services standards, like WS-
Discovery or WSEventing. Its main improvement over 
UPnP is security, in terms of authentication and 
confidentiality, through the use of WS-Security. 
Publish/subscribe systems use 1 → N communication 
scheme: a publisher is able to accept several subscriptions 
from different clients. Thus, all consumers are notified 
when issuing an event. This feature will require that 
observers are managed for each subscriber to the eventing 
channel, and not for each eventing channel.  
5.1 Service for Device Composition 
To create applications from this infrastructure of services 
for devices, we use the Service Lightweight Component 
Architecture (SLCA) [25]. It allows to dynamically 
orchestrate and compose services for devices using light-
weight components. Components are called lightweight 
because they execute in the same memory addres-sing 
space, the same process, and the same component 
container. The container provides the least possible 
technical services, also known as non-functional concerns 
helpers. Distribution thus has to be explicit: if a compo-
nent needs to communicate remotely, it has to embed the 
code to do so. Obviously, we created some external tools 
that can generate predefined components. From Web 
services for devices description interfaces for example, we 
generate client components, that we call proxy compo-
nents. 
Containers manage assemblies of components fully 
dynamically. Component types can be loaded and 
unloaded, component instances and bindings between them 
can be added or removed at run-time. Proxy compo-nents 
are generated, loaded and instantiated dynamically and 
automatically. Thus, we can follow the presence of a 
service in a container, by adding or removing proxy 
components when the service appears or disappears. 
Applications or new functionalities can be created from 
existing services on the infrastructure by managing an 
assembly of components inside a container. Proxy compo-
nents are combined together or with purely functional 
components to transform information. SLCA components 
and services for devices communicate mostly using event-
based communication patterns, which, more than decou-
pling entities and increasing dynamicity, will allow to react 
to context changes efficiently. 
                                                           
2 Universal Plug and Play Forum: http://www.upnp.org/ 
Finally, containers can export functionalities created by 
component assemblies as a new web service for device 
using probe components. Each container has a dynamic 
functional service interface. When a probe component is 
instantiated or destroyed, the interface is dynamically 
modified: a method or an event is added or removed. 
Consequently, interfaces of existing services can be cloned 
using adequate probe components. Such services can be 
secured by adding functional or proxy components to the 
assembly. Hierarchy in the model is possible but has to use 
the service layer, which, moreover, allows it to be 
distributed. 
5.2 Composite Service for Device Adaptation 
Since compositions are based on lightweight components, 
service compositions are fully dynamic. A paradigm called 
Aspect of Assembly [22] allows to adapt composite 
services according to specified rules. Aspects of assembly 
are pieces of information describing how an assembly of 
components will be structurally modified, keeping 
blackbox property of components. Modifications include 
adding components and bindings between them. Aspects of 
Assembly consist of two parts, like regular aspects found 
in Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [26]: pointcut and 
advice. Pointcuts describe to which components the 
modifications described by advices have to be weaved 
(applied). 
If some of the required components expressed in a pointcut 
are not available, the advice won’t be weaved until they 
become all available. Since service discovery is a reactive 
process and that containers notifications are events too, 
aspects can be weaved in response to the appearance of a 
service (and thus a device) on the infra-structure. 
Moreover, aspects of assembly provide associativity, 
commutativity and idempotence properties when several 
aspects are enabled to be weaved at the same time [22]. 
This allows us to manage several aspects of assembly for 
different crosscutting concerns, and ensure that their 
composition is deterministic and that the application 
handles all concerns in a right way. 
5.3 Implementation 
The service for device infrastructure and SLCA are used 
for all parts of the application: publisher, subscriber and 
observers. Observers are trusted entities from the 
publisher's point of view thanks to dynamic insertion of 
authentication components with aspects of assemblies. 
We created a simple example of application, modelled in 
Figure 8. An event publisher service, which can be a 
sensor or any device, is secured by the composite service 
on the left. The client of this secured service is a compo-
site service to simplify the figure. This can of course be 
applied to already existing service clients by only 
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modifying the location (URL) of the service used with a 
security proxy composite service. Observers are managed 
in the context of the client by another composite service, to 
simplify communications.  
 
Fig. 8 Implementation using SLCA. 
An idea behind the use of lightweight components in 
composite services is to enable adapting non-functional 
concerns in the same layer and the same way than the 
functional core of the application. We use aspects of 
assembly in the publisher’s and subscriber’s composite 
services to add the access control logic. 
Since we manage all concerns of the application on the 
same layer, we cannot deal directly with subscriptions 
handled by the underlying service infrastructure. We have 
to manage authorizations for all subscribers at the appli-
cation layer, as we have studied in (4.3). 
Events are encrypted with a group key. When observers 
notify changes of contextual information, if an authori-
zation rule becomes invalid, the security system in the 
composite service of the event producer changes the group 
key. Modifications of the key are spread to the subscribers 
of the event channel using the observers. Indeed, since they 
are in subscribers’ context and they are trusted parties, they 
can safely deliver the new key. 
Aspects of assembly are used to implement contextual 
conditions for authorization. They allow us to manage 
different conditions based on appearing and disappearing 
trusted observers in the environment. Thanks to properties 
of aspects of assembly, and as we created a new 
composition operator with logic OR semantics, we can 
enable several rules to be used at the same time for 
dynamic authorization. Even if they are enabled, they 
won’t apply until all observers needed by the rule, defined 
in pointcuts, are present. The reactive discovery process of 
Web service for device makes adaptation of authorization 
rules reactive. This is useful in cases of context 
overlappings and transitions, or simply to ensure that 
access won’t be denied because of slight changes in the 
highly dynamic infrastructure of ubiquitous computing. 
5.4 Application Examples 
As a common service middleware, our SLCA/AA 
implementation allows to create applications in many 
domains. In smart home security for example, we can 
create contextsensitive secured applications. According to 
the british Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents 
(RoSPA), in 2002, more than 41,000 children were injured 
by thermal effect. In smart homes, with context-aware 
securization, accidents caused by children been left alone 
with dangerous household equipment would be reduced. 
We identified several contextual information that can be 
used in smart home environments: time ranges, locali-
zation partitioned in rooms, presence of persons nearby 
others, status of persons between each other like children 
needing attention and adults who monitor them, and all 
other information provided by devices of the home, like 
the opening state of doors, lights on or off, temperatures, 
and so on. Contextual conditions can be written to take 
into accound this information in authorization. 
Another application in the smart home domain is to allow 
access to the home network and its devices only to persons 
inside a secure place like the house, the cars of the 
inhabitants, or the garden, only if the front door is 
unlocked. All three conditions can be placed in the system, 
but only those relevant with observers would be activated. 
That would prevent intruders to crack into wireless 
networks as it is often the case today, since either they are 
not in a valid context, either don’t have observers related 
to an authorization condition. They wouldn’t either be able 
to falsify these observers and forge their information they 
provide because the trusted entity uses strong cryptography 
to sign information. 
6. Validation 
More than the implementation of the contribution that 
proves that it can rely on existing service architectures and 
dynamic composition, we validate our approach by 
calculating the reactivity of the dynamic authorization 
process; we also compare the number of messages 
exchanged between subjects and controller process for 
quasi-static and dynamic authorizations. 
The process of taking into account changes in contextual 
information in the authorization involves several 
operations. Hence, the time elapsed between the variation 
of a contextual information and the modification of the 
authorization is decomposed as follows: data processing or 
sensing by the observer (o), communication between the 
observer and the proxy component of the event provider 
(c), processing of the φ function (f), and enforcement of 
the condition leading to a key change in the composite 
authorization service (p). reaction time = o + c + f + p. o 
and p are local data processing and take typically less than 
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1 ms to execute. f is also executed quickly, except if it uses 
the history of values to filter inconsistencies. It would then 
need the time between two informations from the observer 
to propagate the new information. c depends on how many 
hops there are between the subscriber and the event 
provider. In ubiquitous computing, wireless networks are 
often used, so c may suffer from an important variance. If 
there is no communication problem and that φ is not 
buffering the information, the reaction time can be lower 
than 10ms. Unfortunately, in such dynamic environments, 
it can reach a few seconds. 
In quasi-static authorization, like lease-based systems, the 
value of the lease is several orders higher. The UPnP 
specification, for example, recommends it to be at least 
half an hour. In security aware systems though, it shouldn’t 
be less than one minute to be efficient enough and not 
power greedy. The reaction time would then be at 
maximum the value of the lease, since the authorization 
process is reprocessed at the same time. 
The number of messages used for the authorization process 
in quasi-static authorization is periodically increased. 
Indeed, the leased subscription makes those messages to be 
send at every lease. Thus, this number follows a linear law, 
function of the time spent using the system. In dynamic 
authorization, messages are sent only when dynamic 
information is modified. It can be higher than the linear 
law if context validity changes more often than the lease 
time. Else, it can be lower in number of message sent, but 
still more reactive. 
7. Conclusion and Trends 
We have described a solution that allows dynamic 
authorization policies based on dynamic information to be 
used to manage message access control. While other 
systems generally use access control at a higher level, like 
accessing the entire system or a connection, we argue that 
in highly dynamic environments access control has to be 
finer-grained. Moreover, end-to-end security is achieved, 
since our contribution does not rely on a dedicated security 
infrastructure and is integrated in the application layer. 
Reactive management of dynamic information changes, 
like context, makes the solution efficient. Finally, context 
can be actually used as an improvement for access control 
systems in the authorization process. 
Future works will study how can several observers’ 
information can be correlated to a single φ function, in 
order to create more complex context-sensitive rules. We 
will also explore how we can generate contextual 
conditions at runtime, to adapt to new environments or 
make the access control process more transparent, as 
imagined in [4]. This may also be used as described in 
[11], to not only change users access privileges, but also 
adjust access permissions of resources. 
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